HARMONIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF CANADIAN AND U.S. GRAINS AND OILSEEDS POLICIES: 1985-1996 by Gray, Richard S. & Smith, Vincent H.
HARMONIZATION  AND  CONVERGENCE  OF CANADIAN  AND  U.S.
GRAINS  AND  OILSEEDS POLICIES:  1985-1996
Richard Gray and Vincent H. Smith
INTRODUCTION
The United States and Canada share the longest common border and largest bilateral
trading  relationship  in the world.  Recent  trading agreements  -CUSTA,  NAFTA and
GATT - hold the promise of further enhancing trade by encouraging  elimination of many
remaining trade barriers.  However, one cause  for concern  about the effectiveness of these
trade agreements has been the frequency of Canadian-U.S.  trade disputes over bilateral wheat
and barley trade arrangements  and trade flows.  To some extent, these disputes  have arisen
because of differences in the domestic and trade policies  implemented by the two countries
although  other political factors  have also clearly been important  causes of disagreements
involving bilateral grains and oilseed trade relationships.
This paper examines changes in U.S. and Canadian grains and oilseeds programs over
the period  1985 to  1996 and provides assessments of whether or not different aspects of the
two countries' domestic and trade grains and oilseeds have converged towards harmonization
since  implementation  of the Canadian-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement  in  1989.  It should be
noted, however,  that many of the changes in each countries'  agricultural policies discussed
in this  study cannot  be attributed to that agreement.  Rather,  many adjustments  that have
taken place since  1988 reflect government responses  to budgetary pressures, commitments
under international  trade agreements, changes in the relative political importance of  rural and
urban voters, and other factors.
Canada has export-orientated  grains and oilseeds sectors in which world markets have
played a large role in determining grain prices,  which in turn has affected how much grain
is  produced, consumed  and exported.  Both sectors have also been the recipient of many
government programs designed primarily to enhance and stabilize farm income particularly
during periods of low prices.  As in Canada, the U.S. small grains,  feed grains and oil seeds
sectors (wheat, barley, oats, corn, soybeans and other oilseeds) are fundamentally important
components  of  the  country's  agricultural  sector.  Also,  as  in  Canada,  although  to  a
considerably  lesser  degree, exports  are an important component of the aggregate  demand216  Proceedings
facing U.S.. producers of these commodities.  Further, again as in Canada,  over the past sixty
years,  U.S. producers  of most of these  commodities  have  benefited directly  or indirectly
from a multitude of government programs.
However,  in Canada and the United States  (as in the European Union and elsewhere)
producers  of  these  commodities  have  encountered  apparently  substantial  changes  in
government programs that appear to reduce government support for agriculture  in general
and  grain  and  oilseed producers  in particular.  Moreover,  in the United States,  the very
recent  changes  in  income  support programs  implement  under  the Federal Agricultural
Improvement and  Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996  have also altered the mechanisms  by which
many U.S. farmers receive subsidies,  largely decoupling them from either current price levels
or current production  decisions.  Similarly,  in Canada, grains and oilseeds producers have
experienced substantial  reduction in levels of support derived from income and transportation
subsidies over the period  1991-1996.
A  GENERAL  OVERVIEW  OF  COMMODITY  SPECIFIC SUPPORT  LEVELS:
PRODUCER SUBSIDY  EQUIVALENTS
Accurate evaluations of the implications of changes  in commodity programs require
careful economic  analysis of  the  full  impacts of these programs  on domestic production,
consumption  and trade,  as well as  effects on the derived demand for inputs.  Aggregate but
partial  measures  of intervention  such  as  Aggregate Measures of Support (AMSs)  and
Producer  Subsidy Equivalents (PSEs) are  only incomplete indicators of the degree to which
commodity specific policies in different countries  are  converging towards harmonization.
The potential for these indicators to be misleading  is especially large  for commodities  such
as grains  and oilseeds whose international  prices vary  substantially when comparisons are
made on a year to year basis.  However, they do provide some indication of movements  in
general  levels  of aggregate  direct  and  indirect  income  transfers  when  computed  on  an
average basis over longer periods of time.
Figures  1, 2 and 3 present average PSEs for the periods  1986-88,  1990-92 and  1993-
95  for  wheat,  other  grains  and oilseeds  respectively.  Between  1986-88  and  1993-95,  in
Canada,  the PSEs for each of the three commodity groups  declined by about half  (from 51
percent to 24 percent for wheat, from 60 to 28 percent for other grains,  and from 31  percent
to  17 percent for oilseeds).  In the United  States, over the same period,  the PSE for wheat
declined  by about one third from 54 percent  to 36 percent,  a smaller proportional decrease
from about the same initial level than in Canada.  For other grains, the U.S. PSE declined by
about half from 42 percent to 20 percent,  a similar proportional decrease to that implemented
in Canada.  For oilseeds, the U.S.  PSE remained constant at the relatively low level  of about
ten  percent.  U.S.  PSE's  for  wheat  and  other  grains  have  almost  certainly  declined
substantially  from their  1993-95  average  levels  as  a  result  of the  decoupling  of income
support payments under the 1996 FAIR Act.  Similarly,  the average wheat, other grains and
Proceedings 216-~~~~Ga  n  mt  1
oilseeds PSE's reported for Canada over the same period overstate  current PSE's because
of the elimination  in 1995  of Canadian grain transportation subsidies.
The data also indicate that distortionary income support programs for wheat and other
grains appear to have been curtailed in both countries and by somewhat similar amounts.  For
oilseeds, Canadian income transfer programs have been substantially  reduced and appear to
have converged towards the modest levels of support provided to U.S.  oilseeds producers.
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FARM INCOME  SUPPORTS
Canadian Farm Income  Supports
Farm  income  support  in  Canada  has  been  delivered  through  several  different
programs.  In the last decade alone the  federal government  operated four different income
stabilization  programs and made three major ad  hoc payments  to producers. The picture is
further  complicated  by provincial  variations  in program  designs.  The only current  direct
income  support program  is the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA).  The predecessors
to  this  programs  were  the  Agricultural  Stabilization  Act  (ASA),  the  Western  Grain
Stabilization Program (WGSP) and the Gross  Revenue Insurance Program  (GRIP).
Figure 2.  Other Grains PSE  Levels  (OECD Estimates)
The WGSP,  introduced  in  1976,  was  designed to  stabilize  income  in the  Western
Canadian  grain sector.  Producers  and the federal  government contributed to a buffer fund
that made payments  to producers  when aggregate cash flow in the grain sector fell below a
five year moving average.  A second trigger,  added in  1982, resulted in payments whenever
net  cash  flow per  marketed  tonne  fell below the previous  five year average.  When  GRIP
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replaced WGSP in  1990,  the fund had accumulated  a large deficit and the income  trigger
values had fallen to very low levels.
After the dissolution  of  the WGSP in  1990, the Grains and Oilseeds Farm Safety Net
Committee, made up of federal  and provincial representatives  and farm leaders,  was given
the task of designing an  income  stabilization program  for the  grain  sector.  In  a report
released  in  August  1990,  the  Committee  recommended  two  new  programs;  the  Gross
Revenue Insurance  Program (GRIP), and the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA).  A
Federal-Provincial  agreement for GRIP led to implementation of the safety net program in
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Figure 3.  Oilseed PSE Levels  (OECD  Estimates)
The GRIP  guaranteed  a minimum  gross revenue  for producers by  giving them the
option  of insuring a  target revenue  per  acre  for virtually  any grain  or oilseed crop.  The
insured level of gross revenue was derived by multiplying a producer's  long term average
yield for each crop by a target price for that crop.  In Saskatchewan, the target price  for each
commodity was equal to 70 percent of a fifteen year indexed moving average price.  A crop
specific  payout was made to a producer when his actual production multiplied by the crop
year  average  market  price was  less than  his  guaranteed  revenue.  The producer paid  33
percent of the premium cost of the program, the federal  government  42 percent and  each
:
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provincial  government 25 percent.  Large payouts were made during the 1991/92 crop  year
but GRIP paid much  smaller amounts after 1992/93  as grain prices rose.  A lack of political
demand  for  the  program  combined  with  more  restrictive  fiscal  situations  at  both  the
provincial  and federal  level resulted in the  elimination of the  GRIP program for the whole
country by  1995/96.
The NISA program was  introduced  in 1991  under the Farm Income Protection Act.
The program allows producer  to contribute  2 percent of qualifying  grain sales'  to a NISA
account  in the  producers  name.  This  contribution  is matched  by  two  contributions  of 1
percent  each  from  the federal  and  provincial  governments.  The  NISA  account  earns  a
subsidized interest rate of prime plus 3 percent.  A producer may withdraw funds  from the
NISA  account  if either  net  income  falls  below  $10,000  (or  family  income  falls  below
$20,000) or the current year's gross margin  (gross revenue minus cash expenses)  falls below
the previous  five year average.  The  government contribution  of 2 percent is equivalent to
an increase  of 2 percent  in the expected price of all grains.  Given the small amount of the
subsidy and the general nature the impact on production the impact of  NISA is currently very
small.
NISA  may  become  more  important  in the  future.  Many policy  makers  view  an
expanded  NISA that includes  all agricultural  commodities  as  the only viable  future safety
Canadian income safety net program.  Originally, contributions to the program were expected
to increase as GRIP was eliminated  but, in the event, partly because  of budgetary pressures,
additional funds were not forthcoming.
U.S.  Farm Income  Supports
The  1973  Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act  established  the  institutional
framework  within  which  U.S.  price  and  income  support  programs  for  grains  were
implemented  in the  1980s and  1990s.  The  key elements of agricultural support policies for
major "program"  commodities - including wheat, corn,  grain sorghum, barley,  oats, and
rice - introduced by the  1973  legislation were target prices  and deficiency payments.  The
1973  Act also retained price  supports  for each crop  through  nonrecourse loan  programs.
Under  the  loan  program,  farmers  could receive  nonrecourse  loans  from  the  Commodity
Credit Corporation  (CCC) for all of a crop raised  on "eligible"  acres (acres on which they
were legally allowed to grow that crop), the amount of the  loan being equal to the output of
the crop multiplied by the loan rate which therefore served as  a minimum  support price.
The  1973 Act created an income transfer program for grains producers based on the
following principles.  Farmers of major commodities were provided with base acreages  for
each program crop  and crop-specific payment yields were assigned to these base acres.  In
any given year, farmers would receive deficiency  payments for a particular crop based on the
difference,  if positive, between the target price and the greater of the national average  farm
'Eligible  sales are gross grain sales minus grain purchases.  Payment from GRIP and Crop
Insurance  are considered  as gross grain sales.
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price  for the  commodity  or the  loan rate.  Producer  payments  were then  established  by
multiplying the payment rate by the producer's eligible production  (eligible program base
acreage times program yield).
In contrast, the 1996 FAIR Act creates  a much simpler system of transfer payments
for U.S.  grains producers.  While nonrecourse  loan programs remain in place,  price-based
deficiency  payments  will be replaced  by  fixed market transition  payments  over the  next
seven years (1996-2002).  Participating producers receive market transition payments equal
to their "payment production" times the payment rate.  Each producer's payment production
equals  85 percent of the farm's  1996 crop acreage base times the farm's  1995-crop program
yield.  Farmers may plant any crops they chose on land eligible for production (that is, land
whose use  is not restricted by commitments  under other programs  such the Conservation
Reserve Program) other than fruits and vegetables.
Several  aspects  of the  structure  and  historical  development  agricultural  income
support programs over the  1973-96 period are of particular  interest in evaluating the degree
to which  the  1996  FAIR  Act represents  a  radical  change  in  U.S.  grains  policy  and  a
significant  movement  towards policy harmonization  with Canada.  The most important  in
this context is the issue of decoupling of income  support payments from actual production
decisions.
From the outset,  the farm  program established  in  1973  began  to decouple current
government income transfers for program  commodities from current output levels.  Unlike
the nonrecourse  loan program, under which crop support loans were based on the producer's
actual production level, the size of the farmer's deficiency  payment was determined by the
farm's payment production, not the current year's production  level.2 However,  prior to the
1985 Food Security Act, current production  decisions could affect deficiency payments by
altering both base acres and assigned  yields in subsequent  years.  For example,  under the
Agriculture  and Food Act of 1981,  the Secretary of Agriculture was given discretion to set
a producer's base, based on the previous year's plantings  or an average of the two previous
years'  planting.  Under the  1985  Act,  a farm's  base acreage  was set equal  to the  simple
arithmetic average of the acreage planted or considered planted to the crop in the previous
five years.  If a producer over planted  his base, he was ineligible  for payments  that year.
This change  reduced substantially  the potential  for building base because of the relatively
stiff penalty it placed on producers who over planted their base  acreage.
Prior to the  1985 Act,  a farm's effective payment yield was set equal to the average
yield for that county or a higher "proven"  yield for the farm based on an Olympic average
of the five previous crop years (calculated by dropping the highest and lowest years from the
average).  This  approach  allowed  income  transfers  to  farmers  to  increase  over time  as
average crop yields increased in response to improvements in technology and/or farm input
decisions.  The  1985 Act essentially froze program yields at 1985 levels.  Thus, effectively,
2 Thus, for example, a producer who suffered a total crop loss would still receive a deficiency
payment equal to the farm's base acreage times its program yield multiplied by the per unit
deficiency payment rate.
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most  links  at  the farm  level  between  current  production  decisions  and  current  or  future
deficiency payment  income transfers  had been severed  by  1986.  In this context, the  1996
FAIR  Act  can  be  viewed  as  simply  completing  the  decoupling process  for  deficiency
payments and production  decisions  that began  in 1973  by ending the system of base  acres
that  required  farmers  actually  to  plant  crops  in  order  to  receive  government  transfer
payments.  The  decoupling  process embedded  in the  1996  Act, while not  representing  a
radical  departure  from  the  trend  line  in U.S.  grain policy,  does imply  a substantial  shift
towards harmonization between U.S. and Canadian grain programs.  The decoupled  market
transition payments which  U.S. grains  farmers  receive  do  give them  a guarantee  income
stream  that  many  Canadian  grains  producers  would  like  to  have,  but  do  not  provide
substantive distortionary incentives  to US producers  to change their production decisions.
Thus they also do not represent a real problem from the perspective of agricultural policy
harmonization.
The U.S. soybean and oilseeds income support programs are quite different than the
programs  for food and  feed  grains.  Under  the  1977  Food  and Agriculture  Act,  soybean
producers  were provided  with  a mandated  nonrecourse  loan (guarantee  minimum price)
program  for the  first time.  Under the  1980 and  1985  Farm Bills, loan rates or minimum
support prices  were established  at 75 percent of the Olympic  average of market prices over
the  previous  five  years.  In  1990,  the  nonrecourse  loan  program  was  extended  to  the
remaining oilseed crops including canola, safflower  seed, flaxseed, mustard seed, sunflower
seed and sesame seed.  In addition  a marketing  loan program was  introduced for soybeans
and all other oilseeds.  However,  there has been no target price/deficience  payment program
for oilseeds.  The  1996 FAIR Act continues both the  nonrecourse  loan rate and marketing
loan programs  for soybeans  and other oilseeds.  The loan rate for soybean  will not be less
than $4.92 per bushel or more than $5.26 per bushel,  but otherwise will equal 85 percent  of
the  five year Olympic  average of market prices.  Minimum and maximum  loan rate prices
for other oilseeds  were reduced very slightly (by about 3 percent) but otherwise no major
changes were made to the loan rate and marketing loan programs for other oilseeds.  Thus,
in the case of oilseeds, there has been very little change  in U.S.  oilseeds income and price
support programs.  However, the levels of support provided to U.S. oilseeds producers under
these programs have been  modest.
Harmonization of Farm Income  Support
The distortionary effects  of Canadian and U.S.  income support programs  for wheat
and other grains have been substantially  curtailed over the period  1990-1996.  Similarly, the
distortionary  effects  of Canadian  income  support programs  for  oilseeds  have also  been
reduced  towards  the relatively  modest levels  associated  with the  U.S.  oilseeds program.
Thus, while  income  support programs  for these commodities  have not been harmonized,
there  has  been  economic  convergence  in  that  producers  of these  commodities  in  both
countries  operate  in policy environments  that  force them to  rely  more heavily  on  market
signals.
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LAND RETIREMENT AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY
Canadian Land Retirement and Environmental Policy
Environmental policy has had very limited  effects on the grains and oilseed sector in
Western Canada.  Environmental problems have largely been restricted to soil depletion and
the loss of wild life habitat.  Many  of the soil erosion problems have been diminished by the
widespread adoption of zero and minimum tillage practices.  Policy has limited cultivation
and retired  cultivated land into non cultivated uses.  The government controls large acres of
fragile lands and leases them to producers only for the purposes of livestock grazing.  This
has restricted  the cultivation of land in southwest Saskatchewan  and southern Alberta.
The Permanent  Cover Program (PCP) which existed in the period  1992-1994,  paid
producers to take marginal  land out of grain production,  i.e.,  land at a high risk of erosion or
salinization,  and place the land  into forage  or pasture  production.  Payments  included a
$20/acre preliminary payment,  which is intended to offset the cost of seeding the targeted
areas,  and a  final payment (of $20  or $50/acre  for a  10 or 21  year  contract respectively).
Payment is made to the farmer once the viability of  the permanent crop has been verified and
the contract signed.  This contract, which includes  an easement on the land title, binds the
farmer  to ensure  maintenance  of the permanent  cover  for the specified time.  It must be
emphasized, this does not mean that the land cannot be put into productive uses. The contract
only prohibits  the farmer from plowing the permanent cover crop under and planting annual
crops. Currently,  about one million acres are enrolled in the PCP.  The effect of this program
on grain is modest given that marginal lands were targeted for the program.
Finally,  it should be noted that  the North American Waterfowl Management  Plan,
a joint conservation  program between the  government and the private sector, has procured
wetland and nesting habitat.  Under the program  about  150 thousand acres of land has been
retired permanently  from cultivation.
U.S.  Land Retirement and Environmental Policy
An important difference between U.S. and Canadian  grain and oilseed programs was
removed  when,  under  the  1996  FAIR  Act,  annual  acreage  reduction  programs  were
eliminated.  Grain  and  oilseed  farmers  now  have  almost  complete  flexibility  over  crop
planting and production decisions.  Under previous  legislation, to be eligible for deficiency
payments a producer had to participate  in the annual acreage reduction program.  Acreage
Reduction Programs (ARP) were implemented to control the costs of deficiency payments
and nonrecourse loan outlays by restricting the  amount of production  eligible  for payment
and by attempting to keep prices high (and deficiency payment rates low) by taking land out
of production.  As market prices  fell in the early  1980s,  government stocks rose, deficiency
payments and loan forfeitures  increased, and acreage reduction percentages were  increased.
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In  1986, for example, corn and wheat producers, respectively, had to set aside 25 percent and
30 percent of their base acreage to be  eligible  for deficiency payments.
By the late  1980s,  the role of acreage reduction  levels for wheat and  feed grains in
controlling  supplies  had diminished  considerably.  This was due  in part to run downs  in
government  inventories  associated  with  the  droughts of  1988  and  1989,  in part  to  the
decisions  of some  farmers  who  chose to place program  acreages  in  the "0-92"  program
established under the  1985 Act,3 and, perhaps most importantly, because of  enrollment in
the  Conservation  Reserve  Program  (CRP),  a voluntary  10-year  paid  acreage  retirement
program initiated by the 1985 Act.  By the early  1990s, the CRP, ostensibly an environmental
program,  had  resulted  in  the  long term  retirement  of over  40  million  acres  of land,
substantially  reducing the need  for annual  acreage reduction programs  for wheat and other
grains.  Thus the abolition of the ARP program under the provisions of the  1996  FAIR Act
is  likely to have little impact on U.S. farm level production decisions  with respect to grains
and  oilseeds.  However,  the removal  of  ARPs from the  inventory of U.S.  farm programs
represents  a step  towards  institutional  policy  harmonization  with Canada with respect  to
grains  and oilseeds.
Restrictive  rules governing  base acreage calculations  under the  1981 and  1985  farm
bills  also made  it  much more  costly  for producers  to switch  to non-program  crops  like
soybeans and thus represented  an important restriction on U.S. grain and oilseed producers'
land use  choices.  Planting  less program  crop  acreage  reduced  eligible base  acreage  in
subsequent years.  Under the  1985 Act,  a producer with a 100 acre corn base who chose to
plant soybeans on those acres would lose 20 acres of corn base  in the subsequent year and
ultimately  one third of that  base unless  he left the program to rebuild base.  Thus, when
soybean prices rose sharply relative to corn prices  in the  late 1980s,  producers were faced
with  little or no ability to shift production  out of corn and into  soybeans due to restrictive
base provisions.
These problems  were  mitigated  in the  1990  Food, Agriculture, Conservation and
Trade Act which introduced the concepts of normal flex acres and optional flex acres.  Under
the  1990 Act, producers  could plant any non-program  or program crop (other than selected
fruits and vegetables) on up to  15  percent of their base  acreage ("normal  flex acres").4 In
addition,  farmers  could choose to forego  deficiency payments on an additional  10 percent of
their base acres  in return for the right to plant those acres to other crops ("other flex acres").
Thus, after  1990, program crop producers could choose to reallocate up to 25 percent of their
base acres to other crops.
The evidence suggests that the planting flexibility provided by the  1990 Act has never
been  fully utilized by producers.  While  it contributed  to the  5 percent increase  in soybean
3 Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,  this was changed  to 85 percent of
the  expected  deficiency  payment  rate.  Under  this  program,  producers  could place  base
acreage  in conserving use and receive  92 percent of their expected deficiency  payment.
4  Under provisions of the Omnibus  Budget Reconciliation  Act of 1990, passed only weeks
after the  1990 Act, normal flex acres were ineligible for deficiency payments.
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acreage witnessed since  1990, program compliance data for crop years  1992-95  showed that
about 50 percent of corn and wheat normal flex acres and over 90 percent of  optional  flex
acres remained planted to corn and wheat.  Moreover,  in no state did the planted acres for
program food and feed grain crops (or soybeans) rise or fall by more than 15 percent between
1990  and  1995.  Thus,  it seems  unlikely that the removal of all  restrictions  on  planting
decisions  at  the  individual  farm  level  will  have  large  effects  on  total  acres  planted to
individual program crops.  Clearly, the planting flexibility generated by the provisions of  the
1996  FAIR Act increased the degrees  of freedom  under which  U.S.  food and feed  grain
producers  operate.  Similarly,  some farmers  may make radical  adjustments  in the mix of
crops they grow.  But in the aggregate, the effects of the  1996 FAIR Act planting flexibility
provisions on aggregate supplies of individual crops are likely to be quite modest. 5 Again,
in  this respect,  U.S.  income  support  programs  have become  relatively  more  similar  to
Canadian programs  for grain and oil  seeds.
The  1996 FAIR Act was noteworthy  for some farm programs with which it did not
grapple in any thorough manner,  including environmental  programs.  Foremost among these,
from the perspective of the food and feed grains sector is, perhaps, the CRP.  Both Congress
and the Clinton Administration  have agreed that the CRP should be extended and the  1996
FAIR Act defines the maximum acreage  for the program between  1996 and 2002 as 36.4
million acres.  However, the Act does not indicate the precise criteria  for program eligibility.
These unresolved issues matter.  If a high priority were placed on water quality criteria, then
land in feed and food grain producing regions currently  in the CRP would move back into
production.  In contrast, if emphasis is placed on  soil erodability and wildlife,  then higher
rents would be paid to keep  land in the CRP in grain producing area such as the Northern
Plains and the Mid West.  In the latter case, grain and oilseed producers would be better off
and U.S. production of these commodities would be lower.
Other U.S. environmental policies have included a plethora of programs such as the
Sodbuster  and  Swampbuster  programs,  the  Wetlands  Reserve  Program  (WRP),  the
Environmental  Quality Incentive  Program (EQUIP), and the Integrated  Farm Management
Program, all of which existed prior to 1996.  Under the 1996 Act, modest changes have been
made to some of these programs and some new initiatives  have been implemented, all with
relatively modest funding levels (although the EQUIP programs funded at $1.3 billion to be
expended over seven years).  None of these programs are explicitly targeted at grains and oil
seed producers  although  all  such  producers  are  eligible  for  benefits  under  most of the
programs.6
5 Farm choices with respect to planting decisions  are affected by relative prices but are also
often heavily constrained  by agronomic  considerations with respect to weather, disease, pest
infestations,  soil  erosion concerns,  etc.  In general,  estimates  of acreage supply response
price elasticities in unconstrained environments  have been quite small.
6 One obvious practical  exception, of course, is the Everglades Agricultural Area program,
under which $200 million is to be allocated for restoration activities in South Florida.  Some
other programs  are also targeted to regions in which grains and soybeans are not major crops.
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Harmonization in Land Retirement and Environmental Policy
For the most part, Canada and the United States have environmental policies targeted
towards some domestic environmental  concerns but these policies have also had farm income
enhancement objectives  associated with supply controls via land retirement.  In the United
States, acreage  reduction  programs were implemented  to  control budgetary  outlays under
target  price/deficiency  programs.  These  have  not been  formally  abandoned  but mainly
because the need  for them has been obviated by voluntary land retirement under the CRP.
There is no obvious trend towards convergence  and harmonization  for either land retirement
programs  or agricultural environmental  programs between the  two countries,  except with
respect to the abandonment  of year-to-year management programs  such as ARPs.
FARM  INPUT SUBSIDIES
Canadian Farm Input Subsidies
Farm credit  in Canada is provided by a mixture  of private sector organizations  and
provincial  and  federal  government  agencies.  In the  grains  and  oilseeds  sector,  the Farm
Credit Corporation (FCC), a federal government crown agency, has played a significant role.
Beginning in the mid- 1980s,  as a result of budget cutting measures, the FCC has very largely
become a commercial entity through which  funds are raised on financial markets  and lent to
producers  on a commercial  basis.  Thus,  currently,  very little subsidized credit  is available
to grain and oilseed producers.
Other input  subsidies have  been limited to provisions of the tax system.  Provincial
governments  have rebated  provincial  road taxes  on  the use  of farm  fuel.  These  rebates
currently remain  in place.  Investment tax credits established by the federal government for
farm machinery  in the  1960s were abolished  in the late  1980s.  Other provisions of the tax
system  such  as  capital  gains  exemptions  for farmland  continue to provide  indirect  input
subsidies.
U.S.  Farm Input Subsidies
Subsidies  for farm  inputs  have  generally  been  indirect  in the United States.  One
important source of subsidies has been the U.S. Farm Credit System and the Farmers  Home
Administration.  During the  1980s,  access  to  subsidized  credit was  expanded.  However,
under the  1990 FACT Act and, again under the  1996 FAIR Act, tighter lending restrictions
were placed on Farmers Home Administration loans.  In addition, under the provisions of the
1996 Farm Credit System Reform Act, the operation  of the Farm Credit System is to be the
subject of an extensive review.
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The tax structure  has also provided  the agricultural  sector  with a variety  of input
subsidies through provisions permitting accelerated deprecation schedules,  investment tax
credits  and  expensing  of  a  modest  amount  investment  outlays.  However,  under  the
provisions  of the  1986  Tax  Reform  Act  the  investment  tax  credit  was  abolished  and
deprecation rules adjusted to be less favorable to farms and firms.  An additional  source of
subsidy involves differential  tax rates  for agricultural  land and real estate.  In many states
within  the  United States,  agricultural  land is subject  to lower tax rates than  land in non-
agricultural  use.
Harmonization of Farm Input Subsidies
Some degree of convergence  has taken place in the United States and Canada with
respect to  the tax treatment of agricultural inputs.  However,  the complex nature  of each
country's tax code makes it very difficult to develop a detailed assessment whether changes
to those codes have led to a greater degree of agricultural policy harmonization.  Perhaps
most significantly,  however,  neither country has implemented policies  that provide explicit
targeted subsidies for individual  agricultural  inputs.
AGRICULTURAL  RESEARCH AND  EXTENSION
Canadian Agricultural Research and Extension
Research  in  the  grains  and  oilseeds  sector  is  funded  by  the  private  sector,  by
commodity check off funds and by the government.  The  largest growth  in private research
has  been for  canola  where hybrids  are  becoming  commercially  viable,  and  in herbicide
resistance.  Public research  expenditures  have remained relatively  stable over the past ten
years.  Much of  this funding is now used for grants where private sector funds are matched
with public funds for research.  Commodity check off funds have increased.  The private
sector is likely to expand research expenditures  as hybridization becomes  viable for other
crops.
U.S.  Agricultural Research and Extension
As  in  many  countries,  agricultural  research policy  in the  United States  has  been
complex, partly because of the dual roles of the  federal and state government.7 In general,
as Alston and Pardey report (Alston and Pardey, Tables 2-5, p 46 and Tables 2-10, p 57) over
7 Alston and  Pardey  provide an excellent recent historical discussion of U.S.  agricultural
research policy  between the eighteen hundreds and  1995.
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the period  1980  to  1993,  aggregate  public  sector agricultural  research  expenditures  have
increased  in real terms at a rate of about 2.3 percent per year.  With respect to agricultural
research, there has been some change in the mix of research funding sources,  with a slightly
increased emphasis  on the use of competitive grants processes.  In contrast, public  funding
for extension activities  has declined since the mid-1980s, a common trend in many countries.
The  1996 FAIR Act did not address agricultural  research  in any substantive fashion  and the
likely  direction  of future  U.S.  agricultural  research  policy  is  not  yet  determined.  The
research provisions of the  1990 FACT Act are to be revised  in 1997 and at this time there is
no clear indication of how federal  agricultural research programs  are  likely to be reformed.
Harmonization of Agricultural Research  and Extension
Relative to Canada, Alston and Pardey have pointed out that the United States spends
a smaller  fraction of the value  of agricultural  production  on publicly and privately  funded
agricultural  research  (2.13  percent  as  opposed  to 4.42  percent  over the period  1981-85)
although  aggregate  absolute  expenditures  are  much  larger.  Little  has  probably  been
accomplished  with respect to convergence  and harmonization of research policies  in the two
countries.  However, the distortionary  impacts of these programs are difficult to assess.
CROP INSURANCE
Canadian Crop Insurance
In  Canada,  crop  insurance  programs  vary  by  province.  In  1985,  Canadian  crop
insurance programs offered 70 percent yield protection.  At that time the federal government
paid half of the premium costs, producers paid half of  the premium costs and the provincial
governments  paid  the  administrative  costs.  After significant  droughts  in the  late  1980s
created large deficits in the insurance  fund, many modifications were made to the program
to maintain  a client base while repaying the  outstanding deficit.  More  coverage  and more
options  for producers were  also provided.  It was recently announced that the governments
of Canada and  Saskatchewan  had agreed  to  pay  off much  of the  outstanding  debt.  Crop
insurance  programs  in  Western  Canada  have  recently  amended  premium  structures.
Provincial  and  federal  governments  pay  eighty  percent  of the  premium  costs  for basic
contracts covering losses in excess of 50 percent of average yields and forty percent of the
additional premiums  associated  with contracts  that provide greater coverage  against yield
losses.
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U.S.  Crop Insurance
As in Canada,  federal crop insurance programs also provide substantial subsidies for
grain and oilseed producers, and especially for wheat and barley producers  in Western States.
As  noted  above,  the  1996  FAIR Act  only  addressed  these  programs  by  removing  the
requirement,  introduced  in  1994,  that farmers  receiving benefits  from  major government
programs purchase catastrophic multiple peril crop insurance contracts.  This was a provision
widely  sought  by  producers  with  very  small  acreages  for  whom the  fixed  catastrophic
contract  fee  of $50  per  crop  made  the  insurance  contract  quite  expensive.  However,
Congress had addressed federal crop insurance subsidies, which averaged over $2  billion per
year  for all crops  between  1990  and  1993,  in the  Federal  Crop Insurance  Reform  Act of
1994.  Under the provisions of this Act, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation  was given
a mandate to achieve  substantial reductions  in loss ratios and to increase premium rates to
accomplish  that objective.  U.S.  crop  insurance  program  subsidies  have increased  in the
1990s  relative to the  1980s  (Goodwin  and  Smith)  and  the  programs  have  become more
complicated.8
Harmonization of Crop Insurance
Crop  insurance  is  likely to persist as  an  increasingly  important  source  of income
transfers  in both the United  States and Canada.  A little progress  has been achieved  with
respect  to  harmonization  in  relation  to these  policies.  However,  it  is reasonable  to  be
skeptical about the probability that these programs will converge in the future.  This is partly
because  of the increasingly  complex mix of insurance  contracts  being offered  in both the




The  Western  Grain  Transportation  Act  (WGTA)  was  a  federal  statute  that  paid
railways a subsidy for the movement of grain from prairie positions to terminal positions at
the West  Coast, the Port of Churchill  and  for all shipments  to Thunder  Bay.  The  1983
8 In particular, a wide array  of new insurance  product based  on either area yields or some
measures of expected farm revenues  have been introduced by the U.S. Federal Crop Instance
Corporation  over the past two years, partly in order to  meet the requirements  of the  1994
Crop Insurance Reform Act and partly as a result of rent seeking activities by private crop
insurance  companies  whose rewards under federal programs  are based  largely on value of
contracts,  not the actuarial  performance of their books of business.
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WGTA legislation  allowed for a payment  of $659 million to the railways with some small
provisions  for inflation and branch  line costs.  Between  1986/87 and  1992/93  the payment
varied between  $721  and $726 million (Producer Payment Panel,  1994).  This payment was
reduced  to $560  million in  1994/95  and  was  then eliminated  with a  one time  lump  sum
payout  in  the  1995/96.  Producers  received  a  payment  of $1.6 billion  dollars  based  on
estimates of land productivity and cropping intensity.  For taxation purposes, this payment
was treated as a capital grant to producers, somewhat increasing  its efficacy.
Producers  now pay a regulated  freight rate for grain based on a cost formula of the
WGTA.  This  has resulted  in an  increase in the cost of grain shipment of $22 per tonne on
average.  This has lowered the price of grain on the prairies relative to world prices.  This
probably creates  a more favorable  environment  for the  development  of a larger livestock
sector.  In 1999 the regulation  of freight rates  is up for review.  If deregulation takes place
producers  could pay  an additional  $20  to  $30 per  tonne  in  freight costs  if freight rates
approach trucking rates  as  they have done  in Montana.  This would tend  to reduce  grain
output  and  increase  livestock  feeding  in the region.  It would  also increase  the economic
viability of trucking grain to the U.S. Mississippi system.
U.S.  Transportation Policy
In the United States, transportation policy generally has not been targeted towards the
agricultural  sector  over  the  past  decade.  Clearly,  subsidies  for  the  maintenance  of
transportation  networks such as those associated with the work of the army corp of engineers
on the Mississippi  may have benefited U.S. agricultural producers.  However, no substantial
changes have  taken place in U.S.  transportation policy  in relation to  the U.S.  agricultural
sector.
Harmonization of Transportation Policy
The substantial shifts in Canadian agricultural  transportation policy  away from rail
freight subsidies  and  towards  a  less regulated  environment  for rail  transportation  have
resulted  in  smaller  differences  between  the  United  States  and  Canada  with  respect  to
agricultural  transportation policy.  It should be noted that differences  in fuel and vehicle tax
programs may have some effects  on the competitiveness  of the two countries'  agricultural
producers  in export markets and each other's domestic markets.  Future deregulation of the
Canadian  transportation  industry  may  lead  to  further  harmonization  between  the  two
countries'  policies.
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GRAIN  MARKETING  AND  EXPORT SUBSIDY  PROGRAMS
Canadian State Trading, Credit Guarantee and Market Access  Programs
The system of  marketing grain in Canada is a subject of some controversy both within
Canada  and  in  the  United  States.  With  the exception  of wheat and  barley  for  human
consumption or export,  grains in Canada are marketed through the private trade.  The grain
handling system is owned and operated by the private grain trade and farmer cooperatives.
There  are no government payments for the construction of the use of grain storage.
The  Canadian  Wheat  Board  (CWB)  has  sole  powers  to  market  non-feed  wheat
originating  in the  designated  region  in western  Canada  for  human consumption  within
Canada  and has sole jurisdiction  for exports.  The CWB also has the sole jurisdiction  for
barley exports  and domestic sales for malting and human consumption purposes produced
in the CWB region.  The CWB has adopted a mandate of maximizing the return to wheat and
barley producers.  The CWB pays producers  an initial price when  grain is delivered,  then
market the grain, deduct any operating costs of the CWB and then return any revenue surplus
to producers  in the  form of a final payment.  The CWB has no mandate  to retain revenues
from producers or to receive any  government  subsidies except in the case of pool account
deficits.
The  CWB  is  currently  at  a  touchstone  for  intense  debate  in  Western  Canada.
Producers have been asked to vote on whether the CWB should maintain its role  in barley
marketing.  Whether or not the CWB retains its monopoly  in exporting barley and marketing
barley  for domestic human consumption, the future of Canadian export programs  for wheat
and barley  is  uncertain.  If the  CWB  remains  in  place,  it  is very  likely  that  substantial
changes  will be made in its operating procedures.  The federal  government has introduced
a parliamentary  bill which would give the CWB greater flexibility  in marketing.  Producers
would be given direct responsibility  for the election of CWB commissioners  who would be
subject to re-election  on a regular basis.
Canadian  exports of grain and oilseeds  are also eligible  for export credit guarantees
under the Credit Grains Sales  Program.  This program  allocates  each importing country to
a risk  category which is allocated  a global credit  ceiling.  If credit is provided under this
programs,  loan conditions  must reflect prevailing interest rates and loan periods must not
exceed  three years.
U.S.  Export Subsidy,  Credit Guarantee and Market Access  Programs
In the United States, targeted  agricultural export subsidies  for grains and oilseeds are
determined  under the Export Enhancement  Program (EEP).  In the late  1980s  and  early
1990s, annual EEP expenditures  amounted  to over one billion dollars  in several  years.  In
accordance  with U.S.  obligations  under the GATT,  under which the maximum permitted
funding  for  export  subsidies  in  2000  is  $579  million,  the  1996  FAIR  Act  provides
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substantially reduced  authorizations  for EEP subsidies  over the period  1996-2002.  These
annual authorizations  range from a low of $250 million in 1997 to a high of $579  million in
2000. However,  the Secretary of Agriculture  has discretionary authority  to implement EEP
subsidies and did not provide any EEPs  for grains or oilseeds  in 1996, a year in which  grain
and oil  seed prices  were relatively  high.  In  years  in which world prices  are  lower,  EEP
subsidies  are  more  likely  to  be  implemented.  Typically,  wheat  has  been  the  largest
beneficiary  of the EEP program,  although barley  and corn exports have received substantial
EEP  subsidies  over  the  history  of the  program.  In  future  low  price  years  for  those
commodities,  the  U.S.  government  is  likely to  provide  EEP  export  subsidies  for those
commodities.  On  balance,  then,  since  1988,  while the  institutional  structure  of the  U.S.
export subsidy program  for grains and oil seeds  has not changed,  funding levels  for targeted
export subsidies have been reduced quite substantially  and, within the GATT framework, the
U.S. agricultural  export subsidy policy is likely  to be further curtailed  after the year 2000.
Food aid programs, operated primarily  under Public Law 480 provisions,  have also
been important for grains, in particular,  wheat, and oilseeds.  These programs, initiated 1954,
were  re-authorized  under the  provisions  of the  1996  FAIR  Act  with  assistance  levels
somewhat  in excess  of those authorized  under the  1990  FACT Act.
Export credit guarantee  programs were introduced  in the  1980  farm bill (GSM-102)
and the  1985  farm bill (GSM-103).  The first of these, GSM-102, authorizes the Commodity
Credit  Corporation  to guarantee,  for a fee, payments  owed to U.S.  exporters  on  deferred-
payments sales contracts when the foreign buyer defaults  on payment.  The second program,,
GSM-103 (the Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee  Program),  guarantees  loans for 3 to 7
years.  Under the  1996 FAIR Act, these programs have been expanded relative to the levels
established under the  1985 and  1990 Acts.
In addition  to  export  subsidy,  food  aid and  export  credit  guarantee  programs,  the
United States also funds  market access  programs.  Under these programs, funds have been
provided to support the work of agricultural commodity marketing organizations such as U.S.
Wheat Associates who could demonstrate  that they have  been harmed by  other countries'
unfair trading practices.  Funded at $200 million per year under the  1990  FACT Act,  the
Market Promotion Program  was subject  to cuts in  1993  under the  1993  Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation  Act and,  again,  in  1996  under the  1996  FAIR Act which reduced  annual
funding  for market  access  programs  to  $90  million.  The  FAIR Act also  abolished  the
Cottonseed and Oilseed Assistance Programs, funded at $50 million per year under the  1990
FACT Act, which were designed to encourage export sales of those commodities.
Harmonization in Export Policy
To  the  extent  that  U.S.  export  subsidy  programs  have become  subject  to  GATT
disciplines  and  funding  for the U.S.  export  enhancement  program has  been reduced,  the
United  States has moved  towards  a less distortionary  set  of  trade policies  for grains  and
oilseeds.  While the removal of freight subsidies has also moved Canada's grains trade policy
in a less distortionary direction,  Canada's export marketing board policy operated through
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the CWB has not changed  in recent years.  With respect to export credit  guarantees, both
countries operate roughly comparable programs,  although under the GSM-103  program, the
United States is able to offer three to seven year lines of credit.  These programs have been
subject only to relatively modest changes over the past ten years.
CONCLUSION  AND  OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Canadian and U.S. farm programs have undergone substantial changes over the period
1988-96.  Most of these changes have been generated  as responses to budgetary pressures,
reductions in the political  influence of agricultural  lobbies,  shifts in grain and oilseed prices
and domestic  concerns  about environmental  and  other  policy objectives.  However,  the
pattern  of reduced  intervention  common  to  both countries  has  resulted  in  considerable
economic convergence  in the grain and oilseeds programs implemented  in the two countries.
It is difficult to predict whether this pattern of convergence will continue, although GATT
and NAFTA related disciplines clearly constrain both countries from substantially increasing
domestic  levels of support  through  conventional  agricultural  price  and  income  support
programs.  However,  it is conceivable  that new  transfer programs could be developed via
farm income safety net programs  such as crop yield and revenue insurance.
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